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Abstract

The present study extends earlier research by presenting the results of a new
and updated version of the RICE model (Regional Integrated model of
Climate and the Economy), labeled the RICE-2009 model. The model is a
regionalized, dynamic model that incorporates an end-to-end treatment of
economic growth, emissions, climate change, damages, and emissions
controls. The model allows projections of what will occur with no policies,
with efficient policies be, how nations can undertake policies to limit climate
change (in the current runs to 2 °C), and the impacts of limited participation.
These new estimates indicate that coordinated international policies have a
substantial economic benefit. The optimal carbon tax is estimated to be $29
per ton carbon ($8 per ton CO2) for 2010 in 2005 prices. The economic
optimum would limit global temperature rise to an average of 2.5 °C over
1900 levels for the 22nd and 23rd century.

This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the Department of
Energy, the Glaser Foundation, and particularly by Yale University. The author is grateful
for research assistance of Xi Chen and Mark Longhurst. Comments and suggestions from
colleagues, especially Zili Yang, have been essential to the improvements in the models.
This version reflect RICE model RICE-2009.beta.082509. This analysis supercedes the earlier
working paper dated July 30, 2009. The main difference is that the earlier version used a
different scaling procedure for combining countries.
1

1

The economics of global warming has become particularly salient with
the engagement of the Obama Administration with proposals to undertake
sharp cuts in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The present study extends
earlier research by presenting the results of a new and updated version of the
RICE model (Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy),
labeled the RICE-2009 model. The model is a regionalized, dynamic model
that incorporates an end-to-end treatment of economic growth, emissions,
climate change, damages, and emissions controls. The model allows
projections of what will occur with no policies, with an efficient set of
policies, with policies to limit climate change (in the current runs to 2 °C),
and with limited participation.
I.

The RICE-2009 Model

I begin with a succinct description of the RICE model, beginning with
the economic sectors and then discussing the geophysical sectors. 2
The approach used here is to view climate change in the framework of
economic growth theory. In the optimal growth model, or Ramsey model,
society invests in tangible capital goods, thereby abstaining from
consumption today, in order to increase consumption in the future (Ramsey
1928, Koopmans 1965). The DICE/RICE models are the extension of the
Ramsey model to include climate investments. The capital stock of the
conventional neoclassical growth model is extended to include investments
in the environment. Emissions reductions in the extended model are
analogous to investment in the mainstream model. That is, we can view
concentrations of GHGs as “negative natural capital,” and emissions
reductions as lowering the quantity of negative natural capital. Emissions
reductions lower consumption today but prevent economically harmful
climate change and thereby increase consumption possibilities in the future.
The world is divided into 12 regions. Some are large countries (such as
the U.S. or China); others are large regions (like the European Union or Latin
The model is available as an Excel spreadsheet on the author’s web page at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/DICE2007.htm. These results are
based on the “beta” version as of August 25, 2009.
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America). Each region is assumed to have a well-defined set of preferences,
represented by a social welfare function, which optimizes that regions
consumption, greenhouse gas policies, and investment over time. The social
welfare function is increasing in the per capita consumption of each
generation, with diminishing marginal utility of consumption. The
importance of a generation’s per capita consumption depends on its relative
size. The relative importance of different generations is measured using a
pure rate of time preference, and the shape of the utility function is given by
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. These parameters are
calibrated to ensure that the model real interest rate is close to the average
real interest rate in real-world markets (Nordhaus 1994, IPCC Second
Assessment, Economics 1995).
The model contains both a traditional economic sector found in many
economic models and geophysical relationships designed for climate-change
modeling. We first describe the traditional sector of the economy — the
economy without any considerations of climate change.
A. Economic sectors
Each country or region is assumed to produce a single commodity
which can be used for either consumption or investment. Each region is
endowed with an initial stock of capital and labor and with an initial and
region-specific level of technology. Population data are from United Nations
2004 updated with more recent estimates through 2008. Output estimates are
purchasing power parity in 2005 U.S. international prices from the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund and are through 2008 with
projections to 2014. CO2 emissions are from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration and are generally through 2006.
Population growth and technological change are exogenous in the
baseline model, while capital accumulation is determined by optimizing the
flow of consumption over time. Output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas
production function in capital, labor, and carbon-energy inputs.
Technological change takes two forms: economy-wide technological change
and carbon-energy-saving technological change. Economy-wide
technological change is Hicks neutral, while energy-saving technological
change is modeled as reducing the ratio of CO2 emissions to carbon-energy
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inputs. Technological change is projected for a frontier region (the U.S.), and
other countries are assumed to have partial convergence to the frontier. For
convenience, both carbon-energy and industrial emissions are measured in
the same units of carbon weight (Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and Boyer 2000).
We calibrate the energy-related parameters using data on historical
and projected GDP and CO2 emissions, and particularly the CO2-GDP ratio
by region. We specify a cost function for CO2 emissions reductions that is
drawn from more detailed models at the national and regional levels from
IPCC Fourth Assessment, Mitigation 2007. Additionally, there is a backstop
technology which can replace all carbon fuels at a relatively high price ($1200
per ton C, declining over time, drawn from IPCC Carbon Capture 2001 and
other sources). The supply curve allows for limited (albeit huge) long-run
supplies of carbon fuels. Because of the optimal-growth framework,
emissions are efficiently allocated across time, which implies that low-cost
carbon resources have scarcity prices (called “Hotelling rents”) and that
carbon-energy prices rise over time (Hotelling 1931).
Solution of a multi-country general-economic equilibrium model poses
major modeling issues (see Rutherford 2009). We have used a modification of
the Negishi procedure introduced in Nordhaus and Yang 1996. The
modification is that the welfare weights are set to equalize the period-byperiod marginal utilities using the weighted average marginal utility, where
the region-period weights are the region’s share of the global capital stock.
B. Geophysical sectors
The geophysical part of the model contains a number of geophysical
relationships that link together the different forces affecting climate change.
This part contains a carbon cycle, a radiative forcing equation, climatechange equations, a climate-damage relationship, and a new sea-level rise
module.
In the current vintage of models, endogenous emissions are limited to
industrial CO2. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are now outside the climatechange control strategy. Other contributions to global warming are taken as
exogenous. These include CO2 emissions from land-use changes, non-CO2
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greenhouse gases, and sulfate aerosols (Hansen et al. 2006, IPCC Fourth
Assessment, Science 2007).
The model uses a three-reservoir model calibrated to existing carboncycle models to calculate the carbon cycle. Climate change is represented by
global mean surface temperature, and the relationship uses the results of the
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC to estimate the lag structure and the
equilibrium (IPCC Fourth Assessment, Science 2007). The current version
assumes that the equilibrium temperature-sensitivity coefficient is 3 °C per
CO2 doubling. The model has also been checked by comparing results with
those of MAGICC 2009.
Understanding the economic impacts of climate change continues to be
the thorniest issue in climate-change economics. The estimates of damages
come from Nordhaus 2007. It assumes that the damage-output ratio is a
quadratic function of global temperature increase. The damage ratio is 2.6
percent global output at a 3 °C increase and 10.2 percent at a 6 °C increase.
The current version of the RICE-2009 model does not differentiate the
damage functions by regions because of the uncertainties associated with the
damage estimates. We plan to introduce region-specific change functions in
the next version.
There have been many recent studies concerned with abrupt and
catastrophic climate change (Oppenheimer 1998, National Research Council,
Committee on Abrupt Climate Change 2002, Oppenheimer and Alley 2004).
Estimates for the economic costs of abrupt and catastrophic climate change
are included in the damage estimates in the RICE model, but the model does
not build in a precise tipping point at a given temperature increase because
that has not be reliably determined.
C. Sea-level Rise
The RICE-2009 model contains a new module with calculations of sealevel rise (SLR). 3 This experimental model contains estimates of the SLR
The derivation of the SLR module as well as a spreadsheet showing the calculations are
available on the author’s web page at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/DICE2007.htm.

3
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associated with different temperature trajectories. The SLR module has five
sources: thermal expansion, small glaciers, Greenland Ice Sheet, West
Antarctic Ice Sheet, and Other Antarctic Ice Sheet. The first two of these are
relatively well modeled in current AOGCMs, while the latter three are
subject to major uncertainties.
The model begins with the SLR-equivalent ice in each of the five
components. Thermal expansion is a function of the temperature of the
upper level of the oceans. For the ice sheets and glaciers, we assume a
minimum melt threshold and a linear melt rate as a function of the difference
between global mean temperature and the melt threshold.
Thermal expansion has been calibrated to both short-run and long-run
model results of OAGCMs and is reasonably consistent with those. Estimates
for the GIS are consistent with the model runs in AR4. The estimates for the
WAIS are more speculative but are consistent with the consensus rather than
the pessimistic views of the potential for disintegration of the WAIS. The
details of the SLR module will be provided in an associated study.
II.

Policy Scenarios

In the runs developed here, we present four alternatives:
1. Baseline: No climate change policies.
2. Optimal: Climate change policies maximize economic welfare with
no participation or other constraints.
3. Limit temperature to 2 °C: The optimal policies are taken subject to
a constraint that global temperature would not increase more than 2
°C above the 1900 average. This run is of interest because it has
been widely supported by environmental activists.
4. Optimization with limited participation: A final run examines a
cost-beneficial policy such as in 2 in which realistic timetables are
placed for the participation of middle-income and developing
countries.
The baseline can be interpreted as complete inaction and stalemate on
climate policy. In this scenario, there are no climate policies. However, it is
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assumed that a zero-carbon backstop technology becomes competitive with
current technologies in 2250, so emissions after that time are zero. The
Optimal run provides the most efficient, or best possible, climate-change
policies; in this context, efficient involves a balancing of costs of abatement
and benefits of reduced climate damages. While it is unrealistic, it provides
an economic benchmark against which other policies can be measured. The
Limit policy is a variant of the Optimal which builds in a precautionary
constraint that a specific temperature increase cannot be exceeded.
The limited-participation run reflects the likely reality that low-income
countries will be relatively slow to participate in a global-warming regime.
Table 1 shows the assumed year in which each region is assumed to join and
the fraction of the emissions of that region which is assumed to be covered in
these runs. See Nordhaus 2007 for a further description and discussion of
these cases.

Region
_________________
US
EU
Japan
Russia
Non-Russian Eurasia
China
India
Middle East
Africa
Latin America
Other High Income
Other Asia

Participation Year first
rate first year participation
___________ ______________
0.95
2010
0.95
2010
0.95
2010
0.80
2010
0.75
2010
0.75
2040
0.60
2050
0.50
2050
0.50
2080
0.80
2040
0.90
2010
0.60
2050

Table 1. Participation rates in limited participation runs
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III.

Major Results

A. The major cases
There are too many results to report comprehensively on the estimates.
The program and results are available in a spreadsheet format at the author’s
website at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/DICE2007.htm.
The major results for the model are shown in Figures 1 through 12.
Figure 1 shows the emissions under the four policies. Unrestrained emissions
are estimated to grow very rapidly. Emissions under the optimal and
temperature-limited paths are essentially flat for the next two to six decades
and then decline after that. The optimal path finds a cut in global emissions
of 50 percent from 2005 in 100 years, while the 2 °C temperature limit path
prescribes zero emissions at about 2085.
Note that these are global figures. Proposals before the international
community relate only to high-income countries and are substantially
smaller on a global level. For example, if high-income countries reduce their
emissions to zero in 2035 but no measures are taken in other countries, the
RICE model indicates that the global temperature increase will peak at 5.3 °C
rather than 6.2 °C in the baseline case
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 rise sharply under the baseline
path, reaching 760 ppm by 2100 (see Figure 2). The two control paths have
some slight continuation in the rise of concentrations from current levels,
peaking between 500 and 600 ppm. (Note these refer to CO2, not to CO2equivalent.) Radiative forcings shown in Figure 3 (which do include non-CO2
GHGs) peak at 4.3 W/m2 in the optimal path and at 3.4 W/m2 in the
temperature-limit path.
Global temperature projections, shown in Figure 4, rise sharply under
the baseline, reaching 3.3 °C in 2100, 5.3 °C in 2200 and peaks at 6.2 °C (all
relative to 1900). The other two paths rise for the early 21st century because of
the momentum of past emissions. They then bend down as emissions
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reductions take place, peaking at 2 °C (obviously) for the temperature limit
path and 2.7 °C for the optimal path. One important point to note is that the
optimal path has a relatively low maximum temperature, and that the
temperature increase averaged over the 2100-2300 period for the optimal case
is 2.4 °C.
Figures 5 and 6 as well as Table 2 show the carbon prices in the
different runs. The baseline carbon prices (which are the Hotelling rents on
carbon fuels) are essentially zero. The optimal and temperature-limit prices
start at $29 to $42 per ton carbon for 2010 in 2005 prices. The optimal prices
grow sharply until they reach the projected backstop price. Note that the
limited-participation run has only a slightly higher optimal carbon price
because the marginal damages are only marginally higher with limited
participation.
Figures 7 and 8 show the projected SLR. These are tentative at this
point because they have not been compared with other integrated assessment
models, although they have been compared with AOGCMs. Figure 7 shows
that SLR in the base case is projected to be 0.65 meters from 1900 to 2100. The
projection for 2200 is 1.6 meters – with about one-half of that coming from
thermal expansion and the balance from the large ice sheets. Figure 8
compares the different policies. Any of the three policy runs limit SLR
substantially because they keep the temperature rise under 3 °C. The two
policy cases have projected SLR around 0.8 meters between 1900 and 2200.
Table 3 shows the stakes involved in the overall costs and benefits of a
global warming program. Using our model discount rates, the optimal
program raises the present value of world income by $2.46 trillion, or 0.16
percent of discounted income. This is the equivalent to an annuity of $12
billion per year. Note that in the optimal case, adding the constraint of 2 °C is
relatively inexpensive, costing a present value of $1.10 trillion. Limited
participation in the optimal case reduces the benefits by $0.73 trillion. Note
that these are not additive factors, however, because a rigid target plus
limited participation can be very costly (not shown).
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B. Comparison with earlier results
It will be useful as well as humbling to compare the current round of
results with earlier RICE/DICE models. These models have almost two
decades of track record, with major revisions in science, economics,
modeling, and software along the way (Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and Yang
1996, Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, Nordhaus 2007).
Figure 9 shows the projected global temperature increase for the next
century. While the estimates have varied, the latest estimate is actually
relatively close to the estimates in the Nordhaus 1994 model. The model’s
geophysics is relatively stable.
Figure 10 shows the calculated optimal carbon price. The numbers are
corrected for inflation but not for other changes in the models or projections.
The near-term estimates are similar to those in the last round while the
longer term estimates are considerably higher. There are several reasons for
the upward revisions. Some are technical issues, such as moving to PPP
exchange rates (see Nordhaus 2007, 2007a). Others come from the
“stagnationist” assumptions about output in earlier rounds. Additionally,
there have been major upward revisions in the projected emissions path of
developing countries, particularly China and India. The increase in the longhorizon prices is due to a much more rapid growth in global output. (Some
of these were reviewed in detail in Nordhaus 2007.)
C. A warning about Panglossianism
We discussed above the importance of global participation in any
climate-control program. This point is also emphasized by an examination of
abatement costs. One of the advantages of the RICE model is that it can show
regional costs as well as global costs. Figure 11 shows the estimated
abatement costs under the optimal program for several regions. The costs rise
sharply over time under the optimal program. The most heavily burdened
regions are China and United States, while Japan is relatively lightly
burdened.
We can also see the difficulty involved in implementing a global
program by examining the sum of abatement costs of middle- and low-
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income countries (these comprise countries outside Japan, the US, the EU,
Russia, and other high income countries). Suppose that high income
countries endeavored to compensate developing countries for their
abatement costs in the optimal program. As shown by the upper line in
Figure 12, these costs would be relatively modest in the near-term decades,
but rise to $150 billion per year by mid-21st century. The questionable
political feasibility of these large transfers suggests either that climate control
programs will be limited to incomplete participation (with the unhappy
results discussed above) or that a consensus among poorer countries will
need to develop rapidly in the near future. Figure 12 also shows the
abatement costs of the non-participants (non-Annex I) countries under the
limited-participation runs. While abatement costs are relatively small in the
early years, they become substantial as countries join the abatement regime.
This point emphasizes that the “optimal” and even the “limits” runs
analyzed here are somewhere between optimistic and Panglossian. They
assume a well-managed world, globally designed environmental policies,
with all countries contributing, with decision makers looking both to the best
geosciences and to sound economic policies, and with rich countries bringing
the poor, the unenthusiastic, and the laggard along sufficient with carrots
and sticks to ensure that all are onboard with no free riding. Human history
suggests that this is an unlikely political environment. Where the actual
outcomes will lie between the optimistic optimum and the fatalistic baseline
will depend upon how these various political factors play out in the years
ahead.
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2055

Carbon prices
Optimal
Limit T < 2 °C
Limited participation

2005
0.00
0.00
0.00

(2005 prices per ton C)
2010
2015
29.33
35.09
42.17
53.60
30.09
35.95

Carbon prices
Optimal
Limit T < 2 °C
Limited participation

2005
0.00
0.00
0.00

(2005 prices per ton CO2)
2010
2015
8.00
9.57
11.50
14.62
8.21
9.81

2020
11.45
18.59
11.72

2025
13.70
23.62
14.00

2025
33.75
94.00
34.28

2025
99.51
233.11
101.01

Carbon prices
Optimal
Limit T < 2 °C
Limited participation

2005
0.00
0.00
0.00

(2009 prices per ton C)
2010
2015
32.26
38.60
46.39
58.97
33.10
39.55

2020
46.18
74.95
47.26

2025
55.26
95.26
56.48

2055
136.11
379.05
138.22

2105
401.27
940.05
407.34

Carbon prices
Optimal
Limit T < 2 °C
Limited participation

2005
0.00
0.00
0.00

(2009 prices per ton CO2)
2010
2015
8.80
10.53
12.65
16.08
9.03
10.79

2020
12.60
20.44
12.89

2025
15.07
25.99
15.41

2055
37.13
103.40
37.70

2105
109.46
256.42
111.11

Table 2. Carbon prices in the different runs
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2020
41.98
68.13
42.96

2025
50.23
86.60
51.34

2055
123.74
344.59
125.66

2105
364.79
854.59
370.31

PV Utility

Policy scenario

Difference

Annualized*
[Billions of
[Trillions of [Trillions Percent
Percent of
$ per
base
2005 $] of 2005 $] of base
year]

Base

1,577.0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Optimal

1,579.4

2.46

0.16

12.32

0.16

Limited participation

1,578.7

1.74

0.11

8.68

0.11

Limit T < 2 °C

1,578.3

1.36

0.09

6.81

0.09

* Annual value of consumption at discount rate of 5 percent per year.
Table 3. Present value of consumption, different policies (scaled to 2005 US
international dollars, 2005 prices)
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